Paper 2017/492 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2017/492 ↗
Reducing Communication Channels in MPC
Abstract
In both information-theoretic and computationally-secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols the parties are usually assumed to be connected by a complete network of secure or authenticated channels, respectively. Taking inspiration from a recent, highly efficient, three-party honest-majority computationally-secure MPC protocol of Araki et al., we show how to perform the most costly part of a computationally secure MPC protocol for an arbitrary $Q_2$ access structure over an incomplete network. We present both passive and actively secure (with abort) variants of our protocol. In all cases we require fewer communication channels for secure multiplication than Maurer's ``MPC-Made-Simple'' protocol, at the expense of requiring pre-shared secret keys for Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-06-22: last updated
- 2017-06-01: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/492
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/492,
author = {Marcel Keller and Dragos Rotaru and Nigel P. Smart and Tim Wood},
title = {Reducing Communication Channels in MPC},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/492},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/492}
}