Paper 2017/565 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2017/565 ↗
A Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves
Abstract
Recent proposals for trusted hardware platforms, such as Intel SGX and the MIT Sanctum processor, offer compelling security features but lack formal guarantees. We introduce a verification methodology based on a trusted abstract platform (TAP) that formally models idealized enclaves and a parameterized adversary. We present machine-checked proofs showing that the TAP satisfies the three key security properties needed for secure remote execution: integrity, confidentiality and secure measurement. We then present machine-checked proofs showing that SGX and Sanctum are refinements of the TAP under certain parameterizations of the adversary, demonstrating that these systems implement secure enclaves for the stated adversary models.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2017-08-29: last updated
- 2017-06-14: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/565
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/565,
author = {Pramod Subramanyan and Rohit Sinha and Ilia Lebedev and Srinivas Devadas and Sanjit Seshia},
title = {A Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/565},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/565}
}