Paper 2017/708 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2017/708 ↗
Reconsidering the Security Bound of AES-GCM-SIV
Abstract
We make a number of remarks about the AES-GCM-SIV nonce-misuse resistant authenticated encryption scheme currently considered for standardization by the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). First, we point out that the security analysis proposed in the ePrint report 2017/168 is incorrect, leading to overly optimistic security claims. We correct the bound and re-assess the security guarantees offered by the scheme for various parameters. Second, we suggest a simple modification to the key derivation function which would improve the security of the scheme with virtually no efficiency penalty.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2017-11-24: last updated
- 2017-07-25: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/708
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/708,
author = {Tetsu Iwata and Yannick Seurin},
title = {Reconsidering the Security Bound of AES-GCM-SIV},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/708},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/708}
}