Paper 2017/901 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2017/901 ↗

Stateful Multi-Client Verifiable Computation

Christian Cachin
Esha Ghosh
Dimitrios Papadopoulos
Björn Tackmann
Abstract

This paper develops a cryptographic protocol for outsourcing arbitrary stateful computation among multiple clients to an untrusted server, while guaranteeing integrity of the data. The clients communicate only with the server and store only a short authenticator to ensure that the server does not cheat. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we extend the recent hash&prove scheme of Fiore et al. (CCS 2016) to stateful computations that support arbitrary updates by the untrusted server, in a way that can be verified by the clients. We use this scheme to generically instantiate authenticated data types. Second, we describe a protocol for multi-client verifiable computation based on an authenticated data type, and prove that it achieves a computational version of fork linearizability. This is the strongest guarantee that can be achieved in the setting where clients do not communicate directly; it ensures correctness and consistency of outputs seen by the clients individually.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2018-08-23: last updated
2017-09-24: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/901
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/901,
      author = {Christian Cachin and Esha Ghosh and Dimitrios Papadopoulos and Björn Tackmann},
      title = {Stateful Multi-Client Verifiable Computation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/901},
      year = {2017},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/901}
}
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