Paper 2018/047 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/047 ↗

The distinguishing attack on Speck, Simon, Simeck, HIGHT and LEA

Boris Ryabko
Aleksandr Soskov
Abstract

The purpose of the work is to estimate the resistance of lightweight block ciphers Speck, Simon, Simeck, HIGHT, LEA to a distinguishing attack. (This attack is a form of cryptanalysis on data encrypted by a cipher that allows an attacker to distinguish the encrypted data from random data.) Modern lightweight block ciphers must be designed to be immune to such an attack. It turned out that Speck, Simon, HIGHT and LEA showed a sufficient resistance to the distinguishing attack, but Simeck with 48-bit block size and 96-bit key size was not immune to this attack.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2018-01-15: last updated
2018-01-15: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/047
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/047,
      author = {Boris Ryabko and Aleksandr Soskov},
      title = {The distinguishing attack on Speck, Simon, Simeck, HIGHT and LEA},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/047},
      year = {2018},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/047}
}
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