Paper 2018/062 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/062 ↗
Countermeasures against a side-channel attack in a kernel memory
Abstract
We proposed a zero-contention in cache lines a cache policy between REE and TEE to prevent from TruSpy attacks in a kernel memory of an embedded system. We suggested that delay time of data path of REE is equal or similar to that of data path of TEE to prevent timing side-channel attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-01-18: last updated
- 2018-01-18: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/062
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/062,
author = {Na-Young Ahn and Dong Hoon Lee},
title = {Countermeasures against a side-channel attack in a kernel memory},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/062},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/062}
}