Paper 2018/1016 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/1016 ↗

Concealing Ketje: A Lightweight PUF-Based Privacy Preserving Authentication Protocol

Gerben Geltink
Abstract

In this paper, we focus on the design of a novel authentication protocol that preserves the privacy of embedded devices. A Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) generates challenge-response pairs that form the source of authenticity between a server and multiple devices. We rely on Authenticated Encryption (AE) for confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the messages. A challenge updating mechanism combined with an authenticate-before-identify strategy is used to provide privacy. The major advantage of the proposed method is that no shared secrets need to be stored into the device’s non-volatile memory. We design a protocol that supports server authenticity, device authenticity, device privacy, and memory disclosure. Following, we prove that the protocol is secure, and forward and backward privacy-preserving via game transformations. Moreover, a proof of concept is presented that uses a 3-1 Double Arbiter PUF, a concatenation of repetition and BCH error-correcting codes, and the AE-scheme Ketje. We show that our device implementation utilizes 8,305 LUTs on a 28 nm Xilinx Zynq XC7Z020 System on Chip (SoC) and takes only 0.63 ms to perform an authentication operation.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2018-10-24: last updated
2018-10-24: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/1016
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/1016,
      author = {Gerben Geltink},
      title = {Concealing Ketje: A Lightweight PUF-Based Privacy Preserving Authentication Protocol},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/1016},
      year = {2018},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1016}
}
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