Paper 2018/1042 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/1042 ↗
Laser-induced Single-bit Faults in Flash Memory: Instructions Corruption on a 32-bit Microcontroller
Abstract
Physical attacks are a known threat posed against secure embedded systems. Notable among these is laser fault injection, which is often considered as the most effective fault injection technique. Indeed, laser fault injection provides a high spatial accuracy, which enables an attacker to induce bit-level faults. However, experience gained from attacking 8-bit targets might not be relevant on more advanced micro-architectures, and these attacks become increasingly challenging on 32-bit microcontrollers. In this article, we show that the flash memory area of a 32-bit microcontroller is sensitive to laser fault injection. These faults occur during the instruction fetch process, hence the stored value remains unaltered. After a thorough characterisation of the induced faults and the associated fault model, we provide detailed examples of bit-level corruption of instructions and demonstrate practical applications in compromising the security of real-life codes. Based on these experimental results, we formulate a hypothesis about the underlying micro-architectural features that explain the observed fault model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2019-02-26: last updated
- 2018-11-02: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/1042
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/1042,
author = {Brice Colombier and Alexandre Menu and Jean-Max Dutertre and Pierre-Alain Moëllic and Jean-Baptiste Rigaud and Jean-Luc Danger},
title = {Laser-induced Single-bit Faults in Flash Memory: Instructions Corruption on a 32-bit Microcontroller},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/1042},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1042}
}