Paper 2018/1059 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/1059 ↗
Quantum circuits for the CSIDH: optimizing quantum evaluation of isogenies
Abstract
Choosing safe post-quantum parameters for the new CSIDH isogeny-based key-exchange system requires concrete analysis of the cost of quantum attacks. The two main contributions to attack cost are the number of queries in hidden-shift algorithms and the cost of each query. This paper analyzes algorithms for each query, introducing several new speedups while showing that some previous claims were too optimistic for the attacker. This paper includes a full computer-verified simulation of its main algorithm down to the bit-operation level.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2019-03-05: last updated
- 2018-11-02: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/1059
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/1059,
author = {Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange and Chloe Martindale and Lorenz Panny},
title = {Quantum circuits for the CSIDH: optimizing quantum evaluation of isogenies},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/1059},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1059}
}