Paper 2018/1117 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/1117 ↗
A Note on Transitional Leakage When Masking AES with Only Two Bits of Randomness
Abstract
Recently, Gross et al. demonstrated a first-order probing-secure implementation of AES using only two bits of randomness for both the initial sharing and the entire computation of AES. In this note, we recall that first-order probing security may not be sufficient for practical first-order security when randomness is re-cycled. We demonstrate that without taking the transitional leakage into account, the expected security level in a serialized design based on their concept might not be achieved in practice.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-11-20: last updated
- 2018-11-20: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/1117
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/1117,
author = {Felix Wegener and Amir Moradi},
title = {A Note on Transitional Leakage When Masking AES with Only Two Bits of Randomness},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/1117},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1117}
}