Paper 2018/1121 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/1121 ↗

An Analysis of the ProtonMail Cryptographic Architecture

Nadim Kobeissi
Abstract

ProtonMail is an online email service that claims to offer end-to-end encryption such that "even [ProtonMail] cannot read and decrypt [user] emails." The service, based in Switzerland, offers email access via webmail and smartphone applications to over five million users as of November 2018. In this work, we provide the first independent analysis of ProtonMail's cryptographic architecture. We find that for the majority of ProtonMail users, no end-to-end encryption guarantees have ever been provided by the ProtonMail service and that the "Zero-Knowledge Password Proofs" are negated by the service itself. We also find and document weaknesses in ProtonMail's "Encrypt-to-Outside" feature. We justify our findings against well-defined security goals and conclude with recommendations.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2021-09-17: last updated
2018-11-20: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/1121
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/1121,
      author = {Nadim Kobeissi},
      title = {An Analysis of the ProtonMail Cryptographic Architecture},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/1121},
      year = {2018},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1121}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.