Paper 2018/155 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/155 ↗

Memory Lower Bounds of Reductions Revisited

Yuyu Wang
Takahiro Matsuda
Goichiro Hanaoka
Keisuke Tanaka
Abstract

In Crypto 2017, Auerbach et al. initiated the study on memory-tight reductions and proved two negative results on the memory-tightness of restricted black-box reductions from multi-challenge security to single-challenge security for signatures and an artificial hash function. In this paper, we revisit the results by Auerbach et al. and show that for a large class of reductions treating multi-challenge security, it is impossible to avoid loss of memory-tightness unless we sacrifice the efficiency of their running-time. Specifically, we show three lower bound results. Firstly, we show a memory lower bound of natural black-box reductions from the multi-challenge unforgeability of unique signatures to any computational assumption. Then we show a lower bound of restricted reductions from multi-challenge security to single-challenge security for a wide class of cryptographic primitives with unique keys in the multi-user setting. Finally, we extend the lower bound result shown by Auerbach et al. treating a hash function to one treating any hash function with a large domain.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2018-05-09: last updated
2018-02-11: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/155
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/155,
      author = {Yuyu Wang and Takahiro Matsuda and Goichiro Hanaoka and Keisuke Tanaka},
      title = {Memory Lower Bounds of Reductions Revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/155},
      year = {2018},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/155}
}
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