Paper 2018/172 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/172 ↗
A First-Order SCA Resistant AES without Fresh Randomness
Abstract
Since the advent of Differential Power Analysis (DPA) in the late 1990s protecting embedded devices against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks has been a major research effort. Even though many different first-order secure masking schemes are available today, when applied to the AES S-box they all require fresh random bits in every evaluation. As the quality criteria for generating random numbers on an embedded device are not well understood, an integrated Random Number Generator (RNG) can be the weak spot of any protected implementation and may invalidate an otherwise secure implementation. We present a new construction based on Threshold Implementations and Changing of the Guards to realize a first-order secure AES with zero per-round randomness. Hence, our design does not need a built-in RNG, thereby enhancing security and reducing the overhead.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-02-14: last updated
- 2018-02-14: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/172
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/172,
author = {Felix Wegener and Amir Moradi},
title = {A First-Order SCA Resistant AES without Fresh Randomness},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/172},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/172}
}