Paper 2018/267 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/267 ↗
A Note on Post-Quantum Authenticated Key Exchange from Supersingular Isogenies
Abstract
In this work, we study several post-quantum authenticated key exchange protocols in the setting of supersingular isogenies. Leveraging the design of the well-studied schemes by Krawczyk (2003), Boyd et al. (2008), Fujioka et al. (2013), Krawczyk and Wee (2015), and others, we show how to use the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) and Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) protocols as basic building blocks to construct efficient and flexible authenticated key exchange schemes featuring different functionalities and levels of security. This note is also intended to be a ``gentle'' introduction to supersingular isogeny based cryptography, and its most relevant constructions, for protocol designers and cryptographers.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-03-20: last updated
- 2018-03-13: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/267
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/267,
author = {Patrick Longa},
title = {A Note on Post-Quantum Authenticated Key Exchange from Supersingular Isogenies},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/267},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/267}
}