Fine-Grained Secure Computation

Matteo Campanelli; Rosario Gennaro

Paper 2018/297 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/297 ↗

Fine-Grained Secure Computation

Matteo Campanelli

Rosario Gennaro

Abstract

This paper initiates a study of Fine Grained Secure Computation: i.e. the construction of secure computation primitives against "moderately complex" adversaries. We present definitions and constructions for compact Fully Homomorphic Encryption and Verifiable Computation secure against (non-uniform) $\mathsf{NC}^1$ adversaries. Our results do not require the existence of one-way functions and hold under a widely believed separation assumption, namely $\mathsf{NC}^1 \subsetneq \oplus \mathsf{L} / \mathsf{poly}$. We also present two application scenarios for our model: (i)hardware chips that prove their own correctness, and (ii) protocols against rational adversaries potentially relevant to the Verifier's Dilemma in smart-contracts transactions such as Ethereum.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2018-10-27: last updated; 2018-03-29: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2018/297
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/297,
      author = {Matteo Campanelli and Rosario Gennaro},
      title = {Fine-Grained Secure Computation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/297},
      year = {2018},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/297}
}