Paper 2018/331 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/331 ↗
Estimate all the {LWE, NTRU} schemes!
Abstract
We consider all LWE- and NTRU-based encryption, key encapsulation, and digital signature schemes proposed for standardisation as part of the Post-Quantum Cryptography process run by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). In particular, we investigate the impact that different estimates for the asymptotic runtime of (block-wise) lattice reduction have on the predicted security of these schemes. Relying on the ``LWE estimator'' of Albrecht et al., we estimate the cost of running primal and dual lattice attacks against every LWE-based scheme, using every cost model proposed as part of a submission. Furthermore, we estimate the security of the proposed NTRU-based schemes against the primal attack under all cost models for lattice reduction.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-12-03: last updated
- 2018-04-10: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/331
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/331,
author = {Martin R. Albrecht and Benjamin R. Curtis and Amit Deo and Alex Davidson and Rachel Player and Eamonn W. Postlethwaite and Fernando Virdia and Thomas Wunderer},
title = {Estimate all the {LWE, NTRU} schemes!},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/331},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/331}
}