Paper 2018/365 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/365 ↗
Anonymous Distance-Bounding Identification
Abstract
Anonymous Distance-Bounding (DB) protocols allow a prover to convince a verifier that they are within a distance bound from them, without revealing their identity. This is an attractive property that enables the prover to enjoy proximity based services, while their privacy is maintained. Combination of anonymity and distance-bounding however introduces new security challenges. We consider two new realistic attacks: a physical layer attack that uses directional antenna, and a collusion attack that involves multiple users. We show all existing anonymous DB protocols become insecure against at least one of these attacks, and then propose a new security model that captures these new attacks, and finally construct two protocols with provable security in this model. Our protocols are the only known anonymous DB protocols with provable security against known attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-10-09: last updated
- 2018-04-18: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/365
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/365,
author = {Ahmad Ahmadi and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Mamunur Akand},
title = {Anonymous Distance-Bounding Identification},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/365},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/365}
}