Paper 2018/456 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/456 ↗

An efficient structural attack on NIST submission DAGS

Elise Barelli
Alain Couvreur
Abstract

We present an efficient key recovery attack on code based encryption schemes using some quasi–dyadic alternant codes with extension degree 2. This attack permits to break the proposal DAGS recently submitted to NIST.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2018-05-21: last updated
2018-05-21: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/456
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/456,
      author = {Elise Barelli and Alain Couvreur},
      title = {An efficient structural attack on NIST submission DAGS},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/456},
      year = {2018},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/456}
}
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