Paper 2018/613 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/613 ↗
One-Message Zero Knowledge and Non-Malleable Commitments
Abstract
We introduce a new notion of one-message zero-knowledge (1ZK) arguments that satisfy a weak soundness guarantee — the number of false statements that a polynomial-time non-uniform adversary can convince the verifier to accept is not much larger than the size of its non-uniform advice. The zero-knowledge guarantee is given by a simulator that runs in (mildly) super-polynomial time. We construct such 1ZK arguments based on the notion of multi-collision-resistant keyless hash functions, recently introduced by Bitansky, Kalai, and Paneth (STOC 2018). Relying on the constructed 1ZK arguments, subexponentially-secure time-lock puzzles, and other standard assumptions, we construct one-message fully-concurrent non-malleable commitments. This is the first construction that is based on assumptions that do not already incorporate non-malleability, as well as the first based on (subexponentially) falsifiable assumptions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-06-22: last updated
- 2018-06-22: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/613
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/613,
author = {Nir Bitansky and Huijia Lin},
title = {One-Message Zero Knowledge and Non-Malleable Commitments},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/613},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/613}
}