Paper 2018/698 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/698 ↗
Parameter-Hiding Order Revealing Encryption
Abstract
Order-revealing encryption (ORE) is a popular primitive for outsourcing encrypted databases, as it allows for efficiently performing range queries over encrypted data. Unfortunately, a series of works, starting with Naveed et al. (CCS 2015), have shown that when the adversary has a good estimate of the distribution of the data, ORE provides little protection. In this work, we consider the case that the database entries are drawn identically and independently from a distribution of known shape, but for which the mean and variance are not (and thus the attacks of Naveed et al. do not apply). We define a new notion of security for ORE, called parameter-hiding ORE, which maintains the secrecy of these parameters. We give a construction of ORE satisfying our new definition from bilinear maps.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-07-24: last updated
- 2018-07-24: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/698
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/698,
author = {David Cash and Feng-Hao Liu and Adam O'Neill and Mark Zhandry and Cong Zhang},
title = {Parameter-Hiding Order Revealing Encryption},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/698},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/698}
}