Paper 2018/755 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/755 ↗
Simulation-Based Selective Opening Security for Receivers under Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks
Abstract
Security against selective opening attack (SOA) for receivers requires that in a multi-user setting, even if an adversary has access to all ciphertexts, and adaptively corrupts some fraction of the users to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts, the remaining (potentially related) ciphertexts retain their privacy. In this paper, we study simulation-based selective opening security for receivers of public key encryption (PKE) schemes under chosen-ciphertext attacks (RSIM-SO-CCA). Concretely, we first show that some known PKE schemes meet RSIM-SO-CCA security. Then, we introduce the notion of master-key SOA security for identity-based encryption (IBE), and extend the Canetti-Halevi-Katz (CHK) transformation to show generic PKE constructions achieving RSIM-SO-CCA security. Finally, we show how to construct an IBE scheme achieving master-key SOA security.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-08-20: last updated
- 2018-08-20: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/755
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/755,
author = {Zhengan Huang and Junzuo Lai and Wenbin Chen and Man Ho Au and Zhen Peng and Jin Li},
title = {Simulation-Based Selective Opening Security for Receivers under Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/755},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/755}
}