Paper 2018/862 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/862 ↗
Attacking RO-PUFs with Enhanced Challenge-Response Pairs
Abstract
This paper studies the security of Ring Oscillator Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) with Enhanced Challenge-Response Pairs as proposed by Delavar et al. We present an attack that can predict all PUF responses after querying the PUF with n+2 attacker-chosen queries. This result renders the proposed RO-PUF with Enhanced Challenge-Response Pairs inapt for most typical PUF use cases, including but not limited to all cases where an attacker has query access.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-09-22: last updated
- 2018-09-22: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/862
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/862,
author = {Nils Wisiol and Marian Margraf},
title = {Attacking RO-PUFs with Enhanced Challenge-Response Pairs},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/862},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/862}
}