Unifying Kleptographic Attacks

George Teseleanu

Paper 2018/870 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/870 ↗

Unifying Kleptographic Attacks

George Teseleanu

Abstract

We present two simple backdoors that can be implemented into Maurer's unified zero-knowledge protocol. Thus, we show that a high level abstraction can replace individual backdoors embedded into protocols for proving knowledge of a discrete logarithm (e.g. the Schnorr and Girault protocols), protocols for proving knowledge of an $e^{th}$-root (e.g. the Fiat-Shamir and Guillou-Quisquater protocols), protocols for proving knowledge of a discrete logarithm representation (e.g. the Okamoto protocol) and protocols for proving knowledge of an $e^{th}$-root representation.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2022-03-15: last updated; 2018-09-23: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2018/870
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/870,
      author = {George Teseleanu},
      title = {Unifying Kleptographic Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/870},
      year = {2018},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/870}
}