Paper 2018/937 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/937 ↗
Improved Brute-Force Search Strategies for Single-Trace and Few-Traces Template Attacks on the DES Round Keys
Abstract
We present an improved search strategy for a template attack on the secret DES key of a widely-used smart card, which is based on a Common-Criteria certified chip. We use the logarithm of the probability function as returned by the template attack itself, averaged over all 28 template positions along the rings representing the C and D Registers of the DES key schedule, as the sorting criteria for the key candidates. For weak keys - which in this attack model have a minimal rest entropy of only two bits - we find that on average only 37.75 bits need to be recovered by brute force when using only a single trace in the Exploitation Phase. This effort goes down to just a few bits for a single DES key when using only a few traces in Exploitation Phase.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-10-05: last updated
- 2018-10-05: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/937
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/937,
author = {Mathias Wagner and Stefan Heyse},
title = {Improved Brute-Force Search Strategies for Single-Trace and Few-Traces Template Attacks on the DES Round Keys},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/937},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/937}
}