Paper 2018/999 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2018/999 ↗
A Refinement of ``A Key-recovery Attack on 855-round Trivium" From CRYPTO 2018
Abstract
At CRYPTO 2018, we proposed a method to reduce the Boolean polynomial of 855-round Trivium. By multiplying a polynomial reduction factor, the output Boolean polynomial is simplified. Based on this method, a 855-round key-recovery attack on Trivium is introduced. In addition, we also give a practical attack on 721-round Trivium to show some rationality and evidence. However, Yonglin Hao et al. find some errors in the 721-round attack recently. As a correction, we propose some new right 721-round example attacks based on our method proposed at CRYPTO 2018.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-10-22: last updated
- 2018-10-22: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/999
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/999,
author = {Ximing Fu and Xiaoyun Wang and Xiaoyang Dong and Willi Meier and Yonglin Hao and Boxin Zhao},
title = {A Refinement of ``A Key-recovery Attack on 855-round Trivium" From CRYPTO 2018},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/999},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/999}
}