Paper 2019/1042 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/1042 ↗

A Machine-Checked Proof of Security for AWS Key Management Service

José Bacelar Almeida
Manuel Barbosa
Gilles Barthe
Matthew Campagna
Ernie Cohen
Benjamin Gregoire
Vitor Pereira
Bernardo Portela
Pierre-Yves Strub
Serdar Tasiran
Abstract

We present a machine-checked proof of security for the domain management protocol of Amazon Web Services' KMS (Key Management Service) a critical security service used throughout AWS and by AWS customers. Domain management is at the core of AWS KMS; it governs the top-level keys that anchor the security of encryption services at AWS. We show that the protocol securely implements an ideal distributed encryption mechanism under standard cryptographic assumptions. The proof is machine-checked in the EasyCrypt proof assistant and is the largest EasyCrypt development to date.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2019-09-18: last updated
2019-09-18: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/1042
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1042,
      author = {José Bacelar Almeida and Manuel Barbosa and Gilles Barthe and Matthew Campagna and Ernie Cohen and Benjamin Gregoire and Vitor Pereira and Bernardo Portela and Pierre-Yves Strub and Serdar Tasiran},
      title = {A Machine-Checked Proof of Security for AWS Key Management Service},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/1042},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1042}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.