Paper 2019/1111 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/1111 ↗

Short Paper: Towards Characterizing Sybil Attacks in Cryptocurrency Mixers

Mikerah Quintyne-Collins
Abstract

Sybil attacks are a well-studied problem in peer-to-peer networking systems. However, their relevance to cryptocurrency mixers has received little attention in the literature, with only a few papers in recent times aiming to design mixers that are resistant to Sybil attacks. A lot of the research has been primarily driven by independent cryptocurrency enthusiasts. We attempt to provide a few characterizations of Sybil attacks as they pertain to mixers and provide mitigations based on economics in order to disincentive Sybil attacks against mixers. In doing so, we highlight that the security of mixers need not only be analyzed through the use of cryptographic techniques but also with the use of economic techniques. Moreover, we provide future research directions in determining heuristics for detecting Sybil identities in mixers.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2019-10-01: last updated
2019-10-01: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/1111
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1111,
      author = {Mikerah Quintyne-Collins},
      title = {Short Paper: Towards Characterizing Sybil Attacks in Cryptocurrency Mixers},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/1111},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1111}
}
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