Paper 2019/1112 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/1112 ↗
Subliminal Hash Channels
Abstract
Due to their nature, subliminal channels are mostly regarded as being malicious, but due to recent legislation efforts users' perception might change. Such channels can be used to subvert digital signature protocols without degrading the security of the underlying primitive. Thus, it is natural to find countermeasures and devise subliminal-free signatures. In this paper we discuss state-of-the-art countermeasures and introduce a generic method to bypass them.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2022-03-15: last updated
- 2019-10-01: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/1112
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1112,
author = {George Teseleanu},
title = {Subliminal Hash Channels},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/1112},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1112}
}