Paper 2019/1236 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/1236 ↗
Single-Trace Vulnerability of Countermeasures against Instruction-related Timing Attack
Abstract
In this paper, we propose that countermeasures against instruction-related timing attack would be vulnerable to single-trace attacks, which are presented at ISPEC 2017 and CHES 2019. The countermeasures use determiner to make operations, which leak timing side-channel information, perform in a constant-time. Since determiner is divided into two groups according to secret credentials, it is possible to recover secret credentials by clustering determiner into two groups.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2019-10-23: last updated
- 2019-10-23: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/1236
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1236,
author = {Bo-Yeon Sim and Dong-Guk Han},
title = {Single-Trace Vulnerability of Countermeasures against Instruction-related Timing Attack},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/1236},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1236}
}