Paper 2019/1251 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/1251 ↗
Lattice-based Zero-knowledge SNARGs for Arithmetic Circuits
Abstract
Succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) enable verifying NP computations with substantially lower complexity than that required for classical NP verification. In this work, we construct a zero-knowledge SNARG candidate that relies only on lattice-based assumptions which are claimed to hold even in the presence of quantum computers. Central to this new construction is the notion of linear-targeted malleability introduced by Bitansky et al. (TCC 2013) and the conjecture that variants of Regev encryption satisfy this property. Then, using the efficient characterization of NP languages as Square Arithmetic Programs we build the first quantum-resilient zk-SNARG for arithmetic circuits with a constant-size proof consisting of only 2 lattice-based ciphertexts. Our protocol is designated-verifier, achieves zero-knowledge and has shorter proofs and shorter CRS than the previous such schemes, e.g. Boneh et al. (Eurocrypt 2017).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2019-10-28: last updated
- 2019-10-28: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/1251
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1251,
author = {Anca Nitulescu},
title = {Lattice-based Zero-knowledge SNARGs for Arithmetic Circuits},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/1251},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1251}
}