Paper 2019/1341 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/1341 ↗
Succinct Non-Interactive Secure Computation
Abstract
We present the first maliciously secure protocol for succinct non-interactive secure two-party computation (SNISC): Each player sends just a single message whose length is (essentially) independent of the running time of the function to be computed. The protocol does not require any trusted setup, satisfies superpolynomial-time simulation-based security (SPS), and is based on (subexponential) security of the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption. We do not rely on SNARKs or "knowledge of exponent"-type assumptions. Since the protocol is non-interactive, the relaxation to SPS security is needed, as standard polynomial-time simulation is impossible; however, a slight variant of our main protocol yields a SNISC with polynomial-time simulation in the CRS model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-02-20: last updated
- 2019-11-22: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/1341
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1341,
author = {Andrew Morgan and Rafael Pass and Antigoni Polychroniadou},
title = {Succinct Non-Interactive Secure Computation},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/1341},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1341}
}