TEDT, a Leakage-Resilient AEAD mode for High (Physical) Security Applications

Francesco Berti; Chun Guo; Olivier Pereira; Thomas Peters; François-Xavier Standaert

Paper 2019/137 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/137 ↗

TEDT, a Leakage-Resilient AEAD mode for High (Physical) Security Applications

Francesco Berti

Chun Guo

Olivier Pereira

Thomas Peters

François-Xavier Standaert

Abstract

We propose TEDT, a new Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) mode leveraging Tweakable Block Ciphers (TBCs). TEDT provides the following features: (i) It offers asymptotically optimal security in the multi-user setting. (ii) It offers nonce misuse-resilience, that is, the repetition of nonces does not impact the security of ciphertexts produced with fresh nonces. (iii) It offers KDM security in the multi-user setting, that is, its security is maintained even if key-dependent messages are encrypted. (iv) It offers full leakage-resilience, that is, it limits the exploitability of physical leakages via side-channel attacks, even if these leakages happen during every message encryption and decryption operation. (v) It can be implemented with a remarkably low energy cost when strong resistance to side-channel attacks is needed, supports online encryption and handles static & incremental associated data efficiently. Concretely, TEDT encourages leveled implementations, in which two TBCs are implemented: one needs strong and energy demanding protections against side-channel attacks but is used in a limited way, while the other only requires weak and energy efficient protections and performs the bulk of the computation. As a result, TEDT leads to considerably more energy efficient implementations compared to traditional AEAD schemes, whose side-channel security requires to uniformly protect every (T)BC execution.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2019-02-13: last updated; 2019-02-13: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2019/137
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/137,
      author = {Francesco Berti and Chun Guo and Olivier Pereira and Thomas Peters and François-Xavier Standaert},
      title = {TEDT, a Leakage-Resilient AEAD mode for High (Physical) Security Applications},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/137},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/137}
}