Paper 2019/1392 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/1392 ↗
Decryption failure is more likely after success
Abstract
The user of an imperfectly correct lattice-based public-key encryption scheme leaks information about their secret key with each decryption query that they answer---even if they answer all queries successfully. Through a refinement of the D'Anvers--Guo--Johansson--Nilsson--Vercauteren--Verbauwhede failure boosting attack, we show that an adversary can use this information to improve his odds of finding a decryption failure. We also propose a new definition of $\delta$-correctness, and we re-assess the correctness of several submissions to NIST's post-quantum standardization effort.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-02-07: last updated
- 2019-12-04: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/1392
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1392,
author = {Nina Bindel and John M. Schanck},
title = {Decryption failure is more likely after success},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/1392},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1392}
}