Paper 2019/1461 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/1461 ↗

Cryptanalysis of two recently proposed PUF based authentication protocols for IoT: PHEMAP and Salted PHEMAP

Morteza Adeli
Nasour Bagheri
Abstract

Internet of Things(IoT) consists of a large number of interconnected coexist heterogeneous entities, including Radio-frequency identification(RFIDs) based devices and other sensors to detect and transfer various information such as temperature, personal health data, brightness, etc. Security, in particular, authentication, is one of the most important parts of information security infrastructure in  IoT systems. Given that an IoT system has many resource-constrained devices, a goal could be designing a proper authentication protocol that is lightweight and can resist against various common attacks, targeting such devices. Recently, using Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) to design lightweight authentication protocols has received a lot of attention among researchers. In this paper, we analyze two recently proposed authentication protocols based on PUF chains called PHEMAP and Salted PHEMAP. We show that these protocols are vulnerable to impersonate, desynchronization and traceability attacks.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2019-12-18: last updated
2019-12-18: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/1461
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1461,
      author = {Morteza Adeli and Nasour Bagheri},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of two recently proposed PUF based authentication protocols for IoT: PHEMAP and Salted PHEMAP},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/1461},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1461}
}
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