Paper 2019/1465 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/1465 ↗
An optimist's Poisson model of cryptanalysis
Abstract
Simplistic assumptions, modeling attack discovery by a Poisson point process, lead to quantifiable statistical estimates for security assurances, supporting the wisdom that more independent effort spent on cryptanalysis leads to better security assurance, but hinting security assurance also relies significantly upon general optimism. The estimates also suggest somewhat better security assurance from compounding two independent cryptosystems, but perhaps not enough to outweigh the extra cost.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2019-12-18: last updated
- 2019-12-18: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/1465
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1465,
author = {Daniel R. L. Brown},
title = {An optimist's Poisson model of cryptanalysis},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/1465},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1465}
}