Paper 2019/163 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/163 ↗
Fast Side-Channel Security Evaluation of ECC Implementations: Shortcut Formulas for Horizontal Side-channel Attacks against ECSM with the Montgomery ladder
Abstract
Horizontal attacks are a suitable tool to evaluate the (nearly) worst-case side-channel security level of ECC implementations, due to the fact that they allow extracting a large amount of information from physical observations. Motivated by the difficulty of mounting such attacks and inspired by evaluation strategies for the security of symmetric cryptography implementations, we derive shortcut formulas to estimate the success rate of horizontal differential power analysis attacks against ECSM implementations, for efficient side-channel security evaluations. We then discuss the additional leakage assumptions that we exploit for this purpose, and provide experimental confirmation that the proposed tools lead to good predictions of the attacks' success.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-01-21: last updated
- 2019-02-20: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/163
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/163,
author = {Melissa Azouaoui and Romain Poussier and François-Xavier Standaert},
title = {Fast Side-Channel Security Evaluation of ECC Implementations: Shortcut Formulas for Horizontal Side-channel Attacks against ECSM with the Montgomery ladder},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/163},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/163}
}