Paper 2019/257 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/257 ↗

Uncloneable Quantum Encryption via Oracles

Anne Broadbent
Sébastien Lord
Abstract

Quantum information is well-known to achieve cryptographic feats that are unattainable using classical information alone. Here, we add to this repertoire by introducing a new cryptographic functionality called uncloneable encryption. This functionality allows the encryption of a classical message such that two collaborating but isolated adversaries are prevented from simultaneously recovering the message, even when the encryption key is revealed. Clearly, such functionality is unattainable using classical information alone. We formally define uncloneable encryption, and show how to achieve it using Wiesner's conjugate coding, combined with a quantum-secure pseudorandom function (qPRF). Modelling the qPRF as an oracle, we show security by adapting techniques from the quantum one-way-to-hiding lemma, as well as using bounds from quantum monogamy-of-entanglement games.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2021-06-25: last updated
2019-03-01: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/257
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/257,
      author = {Anne Broadbent and Sébastien Lord},
      title = {Uncloneable Quantum Encryption via Oracles},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/257},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/257}
}
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