Paper 2019/344 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/344 ↗
Cryptanalysis of Curl-P and Other Attacks on the IOTA Cryptocurrency
Abstract
We present attacks on the cryptography formerly used in the IOTA blockchain, including under certain conditions the ability to forge signatures. We developed practical attacks on IOTA's cryptographic hash function Curl-P-27, allowing us to quickly generate short colliding messages. These collisions work even for messages of the same length. Exploiting these weaknesses in Curl-P-27, we broke the EU-CMA security of the former IOTA Signature Scheme (ISS). Finally, we show that in a chosen-message setting we could forge signatures and multi-signatures of valid spending transactions (called bundles in IOTA).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-02-27: last updated
- 2019-04-03: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/344
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/344,
author = {Ethan Heilman and Neha Narula and Garrett Tanzer and James Lovejoy and Michael Colavita and Madars Virza and Tadge Dryja},
title = {Cryptanalysis of Curl-P and Other Attacks on the IOTA Cryptocurrency},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/344},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/344}
}