Paper 2019/379 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/379 ↗
Non-Malleable Codes for Decision Trees
Abstract
We construct efficient, unconditional non-malleable codes that are secure against tampering functions computed by decision trees of depth $d = n^{1/4-o(1)}$. In particular, each bit of the tampered codeword is set arbitrarily after adaptively reading up to $d$ arbitrary locations within the original codeword. Prior to this work, no efficient unconditional non-malleable codes were known for decision trees beyond depth $O(\log^2 n)$. Our result also yields efficient, unconditional non-malleable codes that are $\exp(-n^{\Omega(1)})$-secure against constant-depth circuits of $\exp(n^{\Omega(1)})$-size. Prior work of Chattopadhyay and Li (STOC 2017) and Ball et al. (FOCS 2018) only provide protection against $\exp(O(\log^2n))$-size circuits with $\exp(-O(\log^2n))$-security. We achieve our result through simple non-malleable reductions of decision tree tampering to split-state tampering. As an intermediary, we give a simple and generic reduction of leakage-resilient split-state tampering to split-state tampering with improved parameters. Prior work of Aggarwal et al. (TCC 2015) only provides a reduction to split-state non-malleable codes with decoders that exhibit particular properties.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2019-04-16: last updated
- 2019-04-16: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/379
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/379,
author = {Marshall Ball and Siyao Guo and Daniel Wichs},
title = {Non-Malleable Codes for Decision Trees},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/379},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/379}
}