Forgery Attack on SNEIKEN

Mustafa Khairallah

Paper 2019/408 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/408 ↗

Forgery Attack on SNEIKEN

Mustafa Khairallah

Abstract

This document includes a collision/forgery attack against SNEIKEN128/192/256, where every message with more than 128 bytes of associated data can be converted into another message with different associated data and the same ciphertext/tag. The attack is a direct application of the probability 1 differential of the SNEIK permutation found by Léo Perrin in [Per19]. We verify the attack using the reference implementation of SNEIKEN128 provided by the designers, providing an example of such collisions.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2019-04-22: last updated; 2019-04-22: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2019/408
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/408,
      author = {Mustafa Khairallah},
      title = {Forgery Attack on SNEIKEN},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/408},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/408}
}