Paper 2019/409 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/409 ↗
Post-Quantum Provably-Secure Authentication and MAC from Mersenne Primes
Abstract
This paper presents a novel, yet efficient secret-key authentication and MAC, which provide post-quantum security promise, whose security is reduced to the quantum-safe conjectured hardness of Mersenne Low Hamming Combination (MERS) assumption recently introduced by Aggarwal, Joux, Prakash, and Santha (CRYPTO 2018). Our protocols are very suitable to weak devices like smart card and RFID tags.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-01-09: last updated
- 2019-04-22: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/409
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/409,
author = {Houda Ferradi and Keita Xagawa},
title = {Post-Quantum Provably-Secure Authentication and MAC from Mersenne Primes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/409},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/409}
}