Paper 2019/414 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/414 ↗
Two-Round Oblivious Transfer from CDH or LPN
Abstract
We show a new general approach for constructing maliciously secure two-round oblivious transfer (OT). Specifically, we provide a generic sequence of transformations to upgrade a very basic notion of two-round OT, which we call elementary OT, to UC-secure OT. We then give simple constructions of elementary OT under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption or the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption, yielding the first constructions of malicious (UC-secure) two-round OT under these assumptions. Since two-round OT is complete for two-round 2-party and multi-party computation in the malicious setting, we also achieve the first constructions of the latter under these assumptions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2020-05-06: last updated
- 2019-04-22: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/414
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/414,
author = {Nico Döttling and Sanjam Garg and Mohammad Hajiabadi and Daniel Masny and Daniel Wichs},
title = {Two-Round Oblivious Transfer from CDH or LPN},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/414},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/414}
}