Paper 2019/444 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/444 ↗
Symmetric-key Authenticated Key Exchange (SAKE) with Perfect Forward Secrecy
Abstract
Key exchange protocols in the asymmetric-key setting are known to provide stronger security properties than protocols in symmetric-key cryptography. In particular, they can provide perfect forward secrecy, as illustrated by key exchange protocols based on the Diffie-Hellman scheme. However public-key algorithms are too heavy for low-resource devices, which can then not benefit from forward secrecy. In this paper, we describe a scheme that solves this issue. Using a nifty resynchronisation technique, we propose an authenticated key exchange protocol in the symmetric-key setting that guarantees perfect forward secrecy. We prove that the protocol is sound, and provide a formal security proof.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2019-06-26: last updated
- 2019-05-08: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/444
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/444,
author = {Gildas Avoine and Sébastien Canard and Loïc Ferreira},
title = {Symmetric-key Authenticated Key Exchange (SAKE) with Perfect Forward Secrecy},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/444},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/444}
}