Paper 2019/457 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/457 ↗
Forgery Attack on mixFeed in the Nonce-Misuse Scenario
Abstract
mixFeed [CN19] is a round 1 candidate for the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Standardization Project. It is a single-pass, nonce-based, AES-based authenticated encryption algorithms. The authors claim that while there are no guarantees for security in terms of confidentiality in case of nonce-misuse (repetition), the integrity security still holds up to 2^32 data complexity. In this report, this claim is not true in case the plaintext length is non-zero (≥ 16 bytes to be exact). We show a forgery attack that requires only two encryption queries with the same nonce and 34 bytes of data.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2019-05-10: last updated
- 2019-05-10: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/457
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/457,
author = {Mustafa Khairallah},
title = {Forgery Attack on mixFeed in the Nonce-Misuse Scenario},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/457},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/457}
}