Paper 2019/460 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/460 ↗
Fast Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials on Standard Smart Cards
Abstract
Cryptographic anonymous credential schemes allow users to prove their personal attributes, such as age, nationality, or the validity of a ticket or a pre-paid pass, while preserving their privacy, as such proofs are unlinkable and attributes can be selectively disclosed. Recently, Chase et al. (CCS 2014) observe that in such systems, a typical setup is that the credential issuer also serves as the verifier. They introduce keyed-verification credentials that are tailored to this setting. In this paper, we present a novel keyed-verification credential system designed for lightweight devices (primarily smart cards) and prove its security. By using a novel algebraic MAC based on Boneh-Boyen signatures, we achieve the most efficient proving protocol compared to existing schemes. To demonstrate the practicality of our scheme in real applications, including large-scale services such as public transportation or e-government, we present an implementation on a standard, off-the-shelf, Multos smart card. While using significantly higher security parameters than most existing implementations, we achieve performance that is more than 44 % better than the current state-of-the-art implementation.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2019-05-31: last updated
- 2019-05-10: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/460
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/460,
author = {Jan Camenisch and Manu Drijvers and Petr Dzurenda and Jan Hajny},
title = {Fast Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials on Standard Smart Cards},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/460},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/460}
}