Paper 2019/472 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/472 ↗
Defeating the Hart et al, Beullens-Blackburn, Kotov-Menshov-Ushakov, and Merz-Petit Attacks on WalnutDSA(TM)
Abstract
The Walnut Digital Signature Algorithm (WalnutDSA) brings together methods in group theory, representation theory, and number theory, to yield a public-key method that provides a means for messages to be signed and signatures to be verified, on platforms where traditional approaches cannot be executed. After briefly reviewing the various heuristic/practical attacks that have be posited by Hart et al, Beullens-Blackburn, Kotov-Menshov-Ushakov, and Merz-Petit, we detail the parameter choices that defeat each attack, ensure the security of the of the method, and demonstrate its continued utility.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2019-05-24: last updated
- 2019-05-10: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/472
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/472,
author = {Iris Anshel and Derek Atkins and Dorian Goldfeld and Paul E Gunnells},
title = {Defeating the Hart et al, Beullens-Blackburn, Kotov-Menshov-Ushakov, and Merz-Petit Attacks on WalnutDSA(TM)},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/472},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/472}
}