Paper 2019/548 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/548 ↗
About Wave Implementation and its Leakage Immunity
Abstract
Wave is a recent digital signature scheme. It is based on a family of trapdoor one-way Preimage Sampleable Functions and is proven EUF-CMA in the random oracle model under two code-based computational assumptions. One of its key properties is to produce signatures uniformly distributed of fixed Hamming weight. This property implies that, if properly implemented, Wave is immune to leakage attack. We describe here the key stages for the implementation of the Wave trapdoor inverse function to integrate all the features to achieve leakage-freeness. A proof of concept implementation was made in SageMath and in C. It allowed us to check that properly generated Wave signatures are uniformly distributed.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2019-10-29: last updated
- 2019-05-23: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/548
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/548,
author = {Thomas Debris-Alazard and Nicolas Sendrier and Jean-Pierre Tillich},
title = {About Wave Implementation and its Leakage Immunity},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/548},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/548}
}