Paper 2019/585 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/585 ↗

On Misuse of Nonce-Misuse Resistance: Adapting Differential Fault Attacks on (few) CAESAR Winners

Mustafa Khairallah
Shivam Bhasin
Anupam Chattopadhyay
Abstract

In this paper, we study DFA attacks on some of the CAESAR competition winners. We study the challenges imposed by the design of these modes, such as masking of the ciphertext. We also show that a very small number of nonce repetition and faults is required, which makes it very practical. We show that OCB and COLM need 1 nonce repetition and 3 faults only to uniquely identify the Key.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2019-05-30: last updated
2019-05-30: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/585
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/585,
      author = {Mustafa Khairallah and Shivam Bhasin and Anupam Chattopadhyay},
      title = {On Misuse of Nonce-Misuse Resistance: Adapting Differential Fault Attacks on (few) CAESAR Winners},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/585},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/585}
}
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