Paper 2019/624 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/624 ↗

Nonces are Noticed: AEAD Revisited

Mihir Bellare
Ruth Ng
Björn Tackmann
Abstract

We draw attention to a gap between theory and usage of nonce-based symmetric encryption, under which the way the former treats nonces can result in violation of privacy in the latter. We bridge the gap with a new treatment of nonce-based symmetric encryption that modifies the syntax (decryption no longer takes a nonce), upgrades the security goal (asking that not just messages, but also nonces, be hidden) and gives simple, efficient schemes conforming to the new definitions. We investigate both basic security (holding when nonces are not reused) and advanced security (misuse resistance, providing best-possible guarantees when nonces are reused).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2019-11-12: last updated
2019-06-03: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/624
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/624,
      author = {Mihir Bellare and Ruth Ng and Björn Tackmann},
      title = {Nonces are Noticed: AEAD Revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/624},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/624}
}
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