Paper 2019/652 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2019/652 ↗
The Exchange Attack: How to Distinguish Six Rounds of AES with $2^{88.2}$ chosen plaintexts
Abstract
In this paper we present exchange-equivalence attacks which is a new cryptanalytic attack technique suitable for SPN-like block cipher designs. Our new technique results in the first secret-key chosen plaintext distinguisher for 6-round AES. The complexity of the distinguisher is about $2^{88.2}$ in terms of data, memory and computational complexity. The distinguishing attack for AES reduced to six rounds is a straight-forward extension of an exchange attack for 5-round AES that requires $2^{30}$ in terms of chosen plaintexts and computation. This is also a new record for AES reduced to five rounds. The main result of this paper is that AES up to at least six rounds is biased when restricted to exchange-invariant sets of plaintexts.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2019-09-14: last updated
- 2019-06-04: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/652
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/652,
author = {Navid Ghaedi Bardeh and Sondre Rønjom},
title = {The Exchange Attack: How to Distinguish Six Rounds of AES with $2^{88.2}$ chosen plaintexts},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/652},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/652}
}